AL– KHOEI BENEVOLENT FOUNDATION a Twelver Shiʿite international charitable organization established in London by the late Grand Ayatollah Abu’l-Qāsem Ḵoʾi (1899-1992).

The Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, commonly called the Al-Khoei Foundation, was established in 1989 on behalf of Grand Ayatollah Abu’l-Qāsem Ḵoʾi. Headquartered in London, the foundation was created as an institutional representative of the Najaf-based ayatollah (see ĀYATALLĀH) with the main mission to help him fulfill transnationally his functions as marja ʿal-taqlīd (‘source of emulation’) for the Shiʿa worldwide. By its structure and activities, the foundation symptomizes key trends of contemporary Twelver Shiʿism: the institutionalization of clerical authority; the expansion of Shiʿite institutions globally, including in the West; and the conduct of faith-based diplomacy as an alternative mode of cleric-led politics to the revolutionary Shiʿism commonly associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Al-Khoei Foundation is an institutionalized form of the Shiʿite system of religious authority known as the marja ʿ iya. Its first and foremost association was, and still is, with the marja ʿ iya of its founder and first patron, the late Ayatollah Ḵoʾi. The foundation has been internally organized mainly on the basis of Ḵoʾi’s interpersonal networks. His family has assumed a prominent role. In line with the requirement that the foundation’s secretary-general should be one of Ḵoʾi’s patrilineal descendants, three of his sons have so far acted in this capacity: Moḥammad-Taqi Ḵoʾi (d. 1994), ʿAbd-al-Majid Ḵoʾi (d. 2003), and, currently, ʿAbd-al-Ṣāḥeb Ḵoʾi (b. 1955). Other offspring have also held various managing positions in the foundation. As such, the Ḵoʾi family became institutionalized along with the institutionalization of Ḵoʾi’s marja ʿ iya. Ḵoʾi’s network of representatives (wokal āʾ) has been another pillar of the foundation’s internal organization. Several of his representatives have served on its multinational board of trustees and as heads of its branches worldwide (Corboz, 2015, pp. 57-64).

If the Al-Khoei Foundation has offered a structure for the institutionalization of Ayatollah Ḵoʾi’s authority, even after his death, it also maintains a connection with a living marjaʿ. Its bylaws stipulate that it should always be supervised by the supreme source of emulation (marja ʿ a ʿ l ā) of any time (Khoei Foundation, p. 15). Following Ayatollah Ḵoʾi, Ayatollah Moḥammad-Reżā Golpāyagāni of Qom (d. 1993) and then Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistāni of Najaf (b. 1930) were offered this rather ceremonial position (Walbridge, pp. 57, 99-102; Corboz, 2015, pp. 66-70). The foundation’s board members who previously acted as Ḵoʾi’s wokal āʾ became Sistāni’s representatives. Crucially, the foundation can also dispose of half the religious taxes (ḵoms) it collects in Sistāni’s name in order to finance its projects. These arrangements ensure that the foundation can continue to operate within the framework of the marja ʿ iya in the long term. This also means that the foundation will have particular stakes in future “successions” of the most widely followed marjaʿ.

As an international philanthropic organization, the Al-Khoei Foundation also exemplifies a trend toward the expansion of Shiʿite institutions globally. To cater to the needs of a growing Shiʿite community in the West, the foundation opened several branches and centers in the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Canada. It also established branches in India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia (closed after a few years). The foundation never established a branch in Iran, and any humanitarian assistance it has provided in the country has been ad hoc. During Ayatollah Ḵoʾi’s lifetime, his marja ʿ iya was represented in Iran more conventionally, through his wokal āʾ, who established large educational projects and other charitable activities with his patronage (Corboz, 2015, pp. 97-100). Regime change in Iraq in 2003 eventually allowed the Al-Khoei Foundation to open a branch in the shrine city of Najaf.

The projects and activities of the Al-Khoei Foundation are diverse, yet without departing much from the type of patronage traditionally offered by Shiʿite religious authorities. This entails the training of preachers and religious scholars in its religious schools and other higher educational institutions, such as the Al-Kauthar Islamic University (Jāmeʿat al-Kawṯar) in Islamabad, Pakistan. The newly established Dār al-ʿElm School (Al-Khoei Institute, per its English name) in Najaf also aims to contribute to the revival of the Iraqi shrine city as a major center of learning and an alternative place of study to Iranian seminaries. In addition, the foundation promotes religious education among the Shiʿite laity, including through its accredited private schools for children in London, New York, and Montreal. The foundation also offers welfare and humanitarian assistance for communities in need, in particular women and orphans. Its assistance generally adopts a traditional distributive pattern rather than a development-based approach.

In the Western countries in which it operates, the foundation also seeks to act as the Shiʿa’s representative in the public arena. The achievements of its London office are noteworthy. Thanks to a good relationship with local and national authorities, it has been involved in commissions on halal food standards, religious studies in secondary education, and the welfare of Muslim prisoners (Corboz, 2015, pp. 115-116; Scharbrodt, p. 8). The foundation also plays an active role in the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which aims, in accordance with the governmental agenda, to promote best practice and good governance of mosques in the United Kingdom. Interfaith dialogue is another aspect of its public engagement (Scharbrodt, pp. 7-8).

Although the Al-Khoei Foundation refuses to label its work as political (Leichtman, p. 6; Corboz, 2015, p. 180), it has developed a distinct form of engagement in Shiʿite politics, coined by Sato (p. 41) as “faith-based diplomacy.” This entails international advocacy and lobbying, including through its general consultative status at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as mediation with specific governments. The situation in Iraq has dominated the foundation’s political agenda. Following a decade of international awareness raising about human rights violations under Baʿthist rule, ʿAbd-al-Majid Ḵoʾi, then the foundation’s secretary-general, saw the 2003 war as an opportunity to return to Iraq from exile and play a role in post-Saddam Iraq. His venture ended in failure with his assassination by a Shiʿite mob in Najaf, which symptomized intra-Shiʿite struggles of the time (Sato, pp. 39-40; Walbridge and Walbridge, pp. 108-11). The Al-Khoei Foundation has also taken on and sought to mediate other causes, for instance in Bahrain, but it has stayed away from Iranian politics.

The Al-Khoei Foundation has paved new ways for the institutionalization and NGO embodiment of the Shiʿite marja ʿ iya. More than a quarter of a century since the death of its founder, it remains a key Shiʿite international actor, although it is not immune from critiques and competition from within the Shiʿite community.