ALA, HOSAYN (Ḥosayn ʿAlāʾ, Moʿin-al-Vezāreh; b. Tbilisi, 1882; d. Tehran, 1964; Figure 1), statesman, gifted diplomat, minister, and prime minister during the late Qajar and Pahlavi periods. He served as a high-ranking official from the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-07 (q.v.) to the time of the White Revolution of 1963-64.
Ala was the third son of Moḥammad-ʿAli Khan ʿAlāʾ-al-Salṭana. His mother was Homā Ḵānom ʿAẓemat-al-Dawla, daughter of Mirzā Moḥammad Khan Majd-al-Molk Sinaki. (For his family relations with a number of high-ranking notables, including Aḥmad Qavām-al-Salṭaneh, Mohammad Mosaddeq-al-Salṭaneh, and Ali Amini through his maternal side, see ʿĀqeli, p. 830; see also Bāmdād, Rejāl III, p. 447-49.)
In 1889 ʿAlāʾ-al-Salṭana was appointed minister plenipotentiary in London, where he remained for some seventeen years. During his father’s tenure, Ala was enrolled at Westminster School in London (1898-1900), where his curriculum included Latin, French, Greek, music, and drawing. He was privately tutored intensively and became an accomplished pianist and a talented caricaturist. He also had private tutoring in Persian studies, which instilled in him an abiding love for the ancient history and culture of Iran. In later years, his formidable mastery of English and French made him an impressive orator, at a time when such deep familiarity with foreign languages was uncommon in Iran. His erudition, sense of humor, often expressed in witty jeu de mots, were proverbial. He studied law at London University, qualifying as a barrister at the Inner Temple in 1906 (Alamuti, p. 102).
FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION TO THE AZERBAIJAN CRISIS
Ala’s career in the late Qajar era. Ala returned to Iran in the midst of the Constitutional Revolution in 1907 and worked under his father’s tutelage at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as his chief of staff; and when his father became prime minister in 1917, retaining the foreign affairs portfolio, Ala administered the ministry on his behalf. He witnessed the manipulative policies of the great powers and their pervasive interference in Iran’s internal affairs during the chaotic period of World War I and its aftermath, when the country was occupied by Russian, British, and Ottoman-German forces. In consequence, he remained wary of their aims from his earliest formative years and became convinced that the survival of Iran depended upon a policy of moderation and judicious compromise, rather than direct confrontation.
In 1918 Ala was made minister of public works (Vezārat-e favāʿed-e ʿāmmeh). In 1919 he was appointed a member of the unsuccessful delegation to the Peace Conference of Versailles, where Iran’s demands were thwarted by the British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon (Olson, p. 205). Ala’s first diplomatic post was as minister plenipotentiary to Spain, but after less than a year he was designated minister to the United States on 25 July 1921. This was soon after the coup d’état of 1299/1921 in February, which marked the rise of Reza Khan Sardārsepah (later Reza Shah) to power. Beset by financial difficulties, the government of Qavam-al-Saltaneh charged Ala with negotiating a United States loan, while offering in return a concession for oil exploitation in northern Iran to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Qavam’s cardinal motive for seeking an alternative partner was to escape from British hegemony (Fāteḥ, pp. 331-38). Ala was also assigned by Prime Minister Qavam to recruit a former adviser at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Foreign Trade, Arthur Chester Millspaugh (1883-1955; see FISCAL SYSTEM v. PAHLAVI PERIOD), to reform the chaotic state of government finances and the taxation structure.
During this period Ala made tireless efforts to enlighten the American public regarding the history and culture of Iran, both ancient and modern, by traveling throughout the United States and talking to business and university audiences. Ala returned to Iran in February 1924 and took his seat in the Fifth Majles, having been elected deputy from Tehran in absentia.
Ala’s career under Reza Shah. Dissatisfaction with Ahmad Shah had been growing, and a bill was proposed to the Majles in late October in order to depose the Qajar dynasty and elevate Prime Minister Reza Khan to the throne. Four deputies voted against the bill: Ala, Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh (on whom, see CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, passim), and Yaḥyā Dawlatābādi voted on constitutional grounds, arguing that the bill fell within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Assembly (Majles-e moʾassesān) rather than the jurisdiction of a routine session of the Majles. Mohammad Mosaddeq argued against placing Reza Khan on the throne (Dawlatābādi, IV, pp. 484-86; Bahār, II, pp. 340-65). Thus, when Reza Khan was invested with the crown by the Constitutional Assembly, Ala, a staunch believer in monarchical government, loyally served the new Pahlavi dynasty, which he saw as a harbinger of modern reform and stability.
In 1927, Ala married Fāţemeh, the only daughter of Abu’l-Qāsem Khan Ḡarāgozlu Nāșer-al-Molk, a former prime minister, who had served as regent while Ahmad Shah was still a minor. She had been educated in Europe and was an asset to him at a time when the government was engaged in various policies of modernization, including improving the legal and social status of women. An educated and active lady, she became very influential in the affairs related to her husband’s various positions (Ḡani, XI, pp. 16, 50, 63, 74-75, 90, 156-57, 230; Alamuti, pp. 107, 111-12; Figure 2).
In 1927 Ala was sent as minister plenipotentiary to France, a five-year assignment marked by notable educational and cultural achievements (Hellot-Bellier, pp. 595-601), including the widely publicized Ferdowsi Millennium celebrations in Paris and London (see FERDOWSI, ABU’L-QĀSEM iv. MILLENARY CELEBRATION (JAŠN-E HAZĀRA)). More significantly for the future of Iran, he meticulously supervised the first wave of students sent by Reza Shah to acquire a European education. They were sent to carefully selected institutions of higher learning, and many of them were later to play influential parts in the political, academic, and cultural life of the country. Ala also actively served as Iran’s representative at the League of Nations, an experience that confirmed his lifelong belief in the benefits of international organizations as a means of safeguarding the rights of less powerful nations (Figure 3).
His next assignment was as director of the recently constituted National Bank (Bānk-e Melli; see BANKING) in 1932 (Tāriḵča, pp. 82-83). In this capacity, he accompanied the Iranian delegation to the League of Nations under the reforming finance minister, ʿAli-Akbar Dāvar (q.v.) to appeal against the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Enteẓām, pp. 112-13, 121-22).
In 1934, Ala was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain. His original aversion to the policies of that country in Iran had moderated, and, although his appointment had not been welcomed by the Foreign Office in 1932, he was well received by the British government (Vezārat-e omur-e ḵārejeh, archive, carton 16, file 24). His two years in London witnessed a marked improvement in Anglo-Persian relations, much of it due to his diplomatic skills and tact. His appointment ended in October 1936. Ala then served briefly as director of the National Bank, but he lost favor with Reza Shah and remained without government employment until the end of the reign.
Soon after accession of Mohammad Reza on 16 September 1941, Ala became director of the National Bank, and on 15 October 1942 he was appointed court minister. He was an ideal choice for this post: his wide experience in administration and diplomacy, his erudition, his stamina vis-à-vis adversity, and his innate optimism made him a role model for the young, inexperienced shah. He held this position until November, 1945, when he was appointed ambassador to the United States.
FROM THE AZERBAIJAN CRISIS TO THE WHITE REVOLUTION
Ala and the Azerbaijan crisis. Both as Iran’s ambassador in Washington and as head of the Iranian delegation at the United Nations, Ala played a significant role during the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. The occupying powers and the government of Iran had enacted a “Tripartite Treaty of Alliance” on 29 January 1942, committing the USSR and Great Britain to evacuating their forces within six months of the termination of hostilities (for original text of the treaty in Persian, see Vaḥid Māzandarāni, pp. 335-47; for its English version, see Iran, Political Developments 1941-1946 III, 1942, parts I and II, pp. 49-56). However, six months after the end of the War, the Soviet Union, which had fostered the armed separatist movements in Azerbaijan (q.v.) and Kurdistan, refused to evacuate its forces on the agreed deadline of 2 March 1946 (see AZERBAIJAN v. HISTORY FROM 1941 TO 1947). Iran's ambassador to Britain, Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh, submitted a formal complaint to the Security Council in London on 19 January 1946. It was accepted as the first item on the agenda at the second session of the Council (for details, see “I. Iranian Question,” Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947, pp. 227-36). Taqizadeh set out Iran’s position at the Council’s third and fifth sessions (for details and the text of 18 letters exchanged between Taqizadeh and Ala, see Taqizadeh, pp. 269-78, 601-16).
Meanwhile, Ebrāhim Ḥakimi resigned, and Ahmad Qavam, a seasoned and shrewd statesman adept at political maneuvering, became prime minister in late January 1946 (Dawlathā-ye Irān, pp. 214-22). Qavam decided to discuss the cessation of Soviet interference in Iran directly with Joseph Stalin, and to this end he flew to Moscow on 19 February. His negotiations with Stalin and his foreign minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, from 20 February to 9 March failed to reach any agreement. Further discussions were postponed until the arrival of the new Soviet ambassador in Tehran (for Qavam’s report to the 15th Majles, see Moḏākarāt-e Majles, 24 October 1947, pp. 2189-201).
The situation became more critical in the first week of March 1946, when, instead of evacuating Azerbaijan on 2 March, the Russian forces began receiving further reinforcements during 3-7 March (FRUS 1946 VII, pp. 340-43; see also the reports of the U.S. vice-consul in Tabriz, Rossow, 1956, pp. 20-21).
Ala, in an important statement to Secretary Byrnes on 5 March, requested that he send a protest note to Moscow with reference to the breach of good faith on their behalf in failing to evacuate unconditionally their forces on 2 March. It pointed out that “the Soviet government is making the evacuation of Iran dependent on the acceptance by the Persian government of certain very important demands, whereas the withdrawal of foreign allied forces at the end of the war has always been considered unconditional” (FRUS 1946 VII, p. 339).
On 11 March, Byrnes and the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sent instructions to their ambassadors in Tehran informing Qavam that “there is nothing in the circumstances for Iran to do but immediately to file an appeal with the Security Council” (FRUS 1946 VII, p. 360).
When the Security Council moved to its present site in New York City in late March 1946, Ala, as head of the Iranian delegation, took up the case and pursued it zealously with his customary diplomatic skills and formidable energy. He achieved this in spite of sustained efforts by the Soviet delegation to undermine his legitimacy, going so far as asking Qavam to remove him as Iran’s representative at the United Nations (Iran, Political Developments 1941-1946 XII, p. 78). When the Council set the date of 25 March for considering “The Iranian Question”/”La Question Iranienne,” the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, objected on the grounds that bilateral talks were underway, and requested a postponement to 10 April. In a blunt rebuttal of Gromyko’s proposal, President Truman, in a press conference on 21 March, confirmed the American determination to seek consideration of Iran’s case in the Security Council on 25 March (for the text of Truman’s press conference, see Public Papers …, pp. 163-64). Ala, along with the American and British delegates, continued to insist that the Iranian question should remain on the Security Council’s agenda (FRUS 1946 VII, p. 360). Eventually, Ala handed to the Secretary General the formal complaint from Iran so that it could be presented before the Security Council as announced by the United Nations (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, p. 329).
On 24 March, one day before the Security Council was to review Iran’s complaint Gromyko announced the Soviet Union’s willingness to withdraw its forces from Iran within five to six weeks (FRUS 1946 VII, pp. 378-79). Nevertheless, at the request of Ala, Iran’s case remained on the agenda until the evacuation of all Russian forces from Iran.
The stormy sessions of the Security Council, which put Ala under great strain, continued until mid-May, when the Soviet forces finally did withdraw unconditionally, restoring Iran’s territorial integrity (for complete accounts of “The Iranian Question” in the United Nations, see the Journal of the Security Council 1-42; and Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1946, pp. 1-4).
Ala as court minister. Mohammad-Reza Shah made his first official visit to the United States in November 1949. Ala, whose term of office as ambassador had expired, nevertheless remained at his post during this visit. He was involved in the negotiations between the shah and the United States government for a loan and military assistance (Vezārat-e ḵārejeh, rešte-ye kār, no 200/7, no 3349), and he prepared the royal speeches and press interviews. On Ala’s return, he was briefly appointed as foreign minister, before returning to the Ministry of Court in late June 1950 (Gāh-nāmeh, pp. 507-18).
During Ala’s absence, political conditions in Iran had changed. The shah had been strengthened by the successful conclusion of the Azerbaijan crisis and now was determined to rule, rather than merely reign. He had the backing of the army and the Senate, half of whose members were his own appointees. The Senate had been created after the attempt on his life on 4 February 1949, in the wake of which a number of opposition parties, such as the National Front, the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and its various front organizations, and Fedāʾiān-e Eslām (see COMMUNISM ii. IN PERSIA FROM 1941 TO 1953, iii. In Persia after 1953), vied with each other for political power (Azimi, pp. 138-53).
Negotiations between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was supported by the British government, and the Iranian government failed, as both sides were unwilling to compromise. The Iranians would accept nothing less than nationalization of the oil industry. The prime minister, General Ḥāji-ʿAli Razmārā, was assassinated by the Fedāʾiān-e Eslām, and a short-lived cabinet headed by Ala was formed on 13 March 1951 (Dawlathā-ye Irān, pp. 243-45). Mohammad Mosaddeq introduced a bill in the Majles, proposing the nationalization of the oil industry, which was approved by both Houses of the Majles (Eṭṭelāʿāt, 9 April 1951). Ala was in favor of nationalization, but resigned; his position had become untenable when Mosaddeq, buoyed up by a wave of popular support, received a vote of confidence from the Majles. Mosaddeq proceeded to form a cabinet, and Ala returned to his post as court minister (Dawlathā-ye Irān, pp. 243-45).
From the outset Mosaddeq faced increasing British intrigues to topple him and abort the oil nationalization movement. The Americans, who were interested in having a share of Iran’s oil, tried to act as mediators between the British and the Iranian governments, but in view of the prime minister’s uncompromising commitment to the principles of the Oil Nationalization Act, British obduracy, and growing Tudeh Party ascendency, they sided with Britain and the shah (Movaḥḥed, I, pp. 247-50).
Ala and Mosaddeq. Ala was praised by the monarchists and Western diplomats for his steadfast loyalty, courage, and decisiveness during the Mosaddeq era, when the shah was living through some of the most difficult years of his reign and becoming increasingly frightened and indecisive (Alam, III, p. 169; Figure 4). Ala’s relations with Mosaddeq remained relatively cordial until 27 February 1953, when a pro-shah riot was mobilized against Mosaddeq and mobs attacked his residence. The crisis began when Mosaddeq informed the shah through a go-between that he intended to publicly expose the conspiracy of the court and the shah against himself on 24 February and then offer his resignation (FO 371/104563, 23 February 1953). Fearful of the consequences, the shah instructed Ala to meet with Mosaddeq and dissuade him from resigning. After Ala met with Mosaddeq on 21 February—when Mosaddeq had insisted that the shah should not leave the country (FO 371/104563, 23 February 1953)—the shah asked Ala to meet with the American ambassador, Loy Wesley Henderson (1892-1986) and inform him of the content of their discussion (FO 371/104563, 23 February 1953). On the same day, Ala met with Henderson and discussed the possibility of Fażl-Allāh Zāhedi or Allāhyār Ṣāleḥ as possible replacements for Mosaddeq (FO 371/104563, 23 February 1953).
On the day before his meeting with Henderson, Ala met with the leading cleric in this tense political period, Ayatollah Sayyed Abu’l-Qāsem Kāšāni (1877-1962), with whom he had cordial relations (Eṭṭelāʿāt, 20 and 21 February 1952). Kāšāni was informed by Ala that the shah intended to leave the country. Kāšāni reassured Ala that he would be able to dissuade the shah (Ḵˇāndanihā, 2 March, 1953). On 23 February, instead of resigning, Mosaddeq paid a visit to the court and provided the shah with evidence of the conspiracy against himself. During their four-hour discussion, the shah informed Mosaddeq of his decision to take a trip and argued that his temporary absence would be to the benefit of the country (Eṭṭelāʿāt, 24 February, 1953; Mosaddeq, pp. 262-67).
In his meetings with Henderson, Ala informed him that he thought that the shah and Mosaddeq were irreconcilable. Steps needed to be taken to remove Mosaddeq in order to stop any further waning of the shah’s authority. Ala also informed him that the view of the politicians with whom he had discussed this issue was that Mosaddeq had to be removed as soon as possible and that most of them were in favor of Zāhedi as the most likely candidate capable of replacing Mosaddeq. Ala also reminded Henderson that Zāhedi had the support of Kāšāni as well as several influential Majles deputies, including Moẓaffar Baqāʾi, Abu’l-Ḥasan Ḥāʾerizādeh, Ḥosayn Makki, and the Ḏolfaqāri brothers, Moḥammad and Nāṣer (FRUS 1952-1954, 31 March 1953, X, pp. 719-21).
Ala met with Zāhedi, who accepted the offer of being appointed as prime minister and suggested that the shah should openly criticize Mosaddeq, thereby perhaps forcing him to resign (FRUS 1952-1954, 31 March 1953, X, pp. 719-21). Ala maintained regular contact with Henderson during this period, while in his meetings with the shah he argued the case in favor of Zāhedi's candidacy as prime minister (FO 371/104564, 7 April 1953). Thus Ala seems to have been pursuing two alternative strategies: to force Mosaddeq out of office legally through a vote in the Majles—the way most favored by the shah—and, if that did not work, to remove him by force. This was actually what would happen four months later, on 19 August 1953 (Rahnema, pp. 894, 896-911; FRUS 1952-1954, 15 April 1953, X, pp. 723-25). On 22 April, however, the shah gave in to Mosaddeq's request, conveyed through Ḥosayn Fāṭemi (q.v.), and Ala was replaced by Abu’l-Qāsem Amini as court minister (FO 371/104565, 1 May 1953; Eṭṭelāʿāt, 25 April 1953).
The failure of various attempts to remove Mosaddeq through legal measures and even by the murder of the chief of police, Brigadier-General Maḥmud Afšārṭus, by a group of retired army brigadiers eventually led to the 19 August coup d’état (see COUP D’ETAT OF 1332 Š./1953) organized by the CIA and the British MI6. The coup succeeded through mobilization of elements of the security forces and the mob leaders in southern Tehran, and General Zāhedi was appointed prime minister. The coup d’état marked the re-emergence of royal power. It also marked the ascendency of the United States politically, economically, and militarily in Iran (Gasiorowski and Byrne).
Ala as prime minister 1955-57. The shah could never abide a strong prime minister, and Zāhedi was dismissed after two years. Ala replaced him on 5 April 1955 (Dawlathā-ye Irān, pp. 267-70; Figure 5, Figure 6). After selecting his cabinet, Ala had to leave for France to undergo surgery and was absent for two months. The Majles was exceptionally unruly at this time, and ministers came under constant attack, as was reported with relish in the press, which still enjoyed some freedom. On 11 October 1955 the Majles and the Senate voted in favor of joining the Baghdad Pact composed of Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Britain (Vezārat-e ḵārejeh, baḵš-e kār 1, rešta-ye kār 3, file 36). The United States supported the Pact but did not join it. Ala was on the point of going to Baghdad for the signing formalities, when he was wounded in an assassination attempt by a member of the Fedāʾiān-e Eslām.
Ala’s premiership ended on 2 April 1957, and he returned to his former position as court minister. He was then seventy-three. He continued to use his position and prestige to counsel the shah, pointing out the misdemeanors of his relatives or the corruption of his close advisers and courtiers. He still advised moderation and warned against questionable policies (Vezārat-e darbār, no. 159, 141, 142, 160, 161, 162), but he gradually lost much of his influence.
The end of Ala’s political career. When urban riots erupted in June 1963 as a reaction to the arrest of the popular Grand Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, and some 100 demonstrators were killed (see ISLAM IN IRAN xiii. ISLAMIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN 20TH CENTURY IRAN), anxiety concerning the outcome of these violent events led Ala to invite several experienced members of the political elite, including ʿAbd-Allāh Enteẓām, Sardār Fāḵer Ḥekmat, and General Mortażā Yazdānpanāh, to a private meeting for consultation. It was his intention to warn the shah of the impending crisis. Apparently, when Yazdānpanāh learned that the meeting was convened without the shah’s permission, he left the meeting and informed the shah. The meeting was thus adversely reported to the shah, who was angered, and he summarily dismissed the participants (Alam, II, p. 387; Zonis, pp. 63-65). He did later appoint Ala as senator, perhaps in mitigation for his abrupt dismissal after so many years of loyal service. Ala took on his new appointment with equanimity and with his habitual discipline began studying the proceedings of the Senate.
Ala and reforming Iran’s freemasonry. Ala is praised by those who opposed Iran’s freemasonry, regarding it as a “British secret society in the country,” for two successful measures to reform the order: first, the closing of the ill-reputed Homāyun Lodge in 1954; and second, the formation of the independent Grand Lodge of Iran in the early 1960s (Rāʾin, III, pp. 516-32). Although Ala first supported Moḥammad-Ḵalīl Javāheri when he established the Pahlavi Lodge (later Homāyun Lodge) in the early 1950s, when he learned that Javāheri had used the lodge for political and personal gain, he became instrumental in closing it down in 1954 (Rāʾin, III, pp. 516-19).
Ala along with his old friends and colleagues, Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh (Figure 7) and ʿAbd-Allāh Enteẓām, initiated the formation of an independent patriotic masonry in Iran without any affiliation with the British and French lodges. In December 1960, they formed the Independent Grand Lodge of Iran with Ala as grand master. According to Rāʾin (III, pp. 524-26) the formation of an independent Masonic order in Iran met with a mixture of disapproval, resistance, and obstruction from the British-dominated Scottish and French Lodges. Eventually, in a countermove, Jaʿfar Šarif-Emāmi broke with the independent Grand Lodge of Iran and formed the foreign-affiliated Grand Lodge of Iran in 1961. Thereafter, the grand lodges of Scotland, France, and Germany declined to recognize the independent Iran’s Grand Lodge and declared it an irregular order (see FREEMASONRY iii).
Besides politics and his active role in the establishment of Iran’s independent masonry order, Ala had several other interests, particularly favoring all youth organizations, sports, education, and cultural activities. He initiated or led many organizations such as the Iran Society in Britain, the Book Society, the Iran Heritage Society, the Iranian Society of the United Nations, the Iran-America Society, and the Iran Foundation in New York (which established the Nemazi Hospital in Shiraz), and he founded the monthly journal of the National Bank (Majalla-ye Bānk-e melli) and the Franco-Iranian Chamber of Commerce. He was also a member or honorary head of numerous organizations, such as the Scouting Organization of Iran, Lions Clubs International, and the Red Lion and Sun Society.
Character traits. Ala has been praised as a statesman who was never a manipulative or ambitious politician. Rather, he was a man who shunned publicity and faithfully adhered to certain principles throughout his sixty years of service to his country with integrity and without expectation of reward. Yet like all men of power his personality and performance have been described in different ways. Sir Denis Wright (p. 395) writes of Ala as “a man of wit and wisdom, patriotism and profound appreciation for the complexities of world politics and encyclopedic knowledge of men and events.” Moṣṭafā Alamuti (pp. 106-18), believes that, while Ala was one of Iran’s valuable personalities as a gifted diplomat who played a significant role in foreign policy and international relations, he was not considered as a powerful prime minister. Fakhreddin Azimi, (p. 160) states that Ala “was better known as a loyal and well-meaning royalist rather than as a man of guile or cunning or a skillful administrator and effective head of government.” Qāsem Ḡani, who criticizes Ala as being an “over-trustful” statesman (a view shared by Naṣr-Allāh Enteẓām, p. 125, a confidant of Ala, and Seifpour Fatemi, 2000, p. 228, his colleague at the United Nations), believes that he was a man of principles, integrity, kindness, honesty, and courage, with love of and devotion to his country (Ḡani, XI, pp. 156-57, 226-29).
Ala died at the age of eighty-two in his home during the summer of 1964. He left a son and a daughter, and was survived by his wife, who died in 1981. His son, Dr. Fereydoun Ala, was the founding director of the National Iranian Blood Transfusion Service (see BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES IN IRAN) and is currently honorary president of the Iranian Comprehensive Haemophilia Care Center. His daughter, Irān, is married to Eskandar Firouz, the noted authority on Iranian fauna and environmental topics and a valuable contributor to the Encyclopædia Iranica.
Archival sources and published documents.
American and British sources:
[FO] U.K. Foreign Office documents, The National Archives, Kew, London.
[FRUS] U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VII: The Near East and Africa, repr., Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 289-567.
Idem, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Volume X: Iran 1951-1954, repr., Washington, D.C., 1989.
J. C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, 1914-1945, A Documentary Record, 2nd ed., New Haven, Conn., 1979.
Iran, Political Developments 1941-1946: Iran Under Allied Occupation: British Documentary Sources, ed. A. L. P. Burdett, 13 vols., Archive Editions, London, 2008.
R. R. James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, VII: 1943-1949, New York, 1974, pp. 7285-93.
Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1946, Washington, D.C., 1962.
Iranian archival sources:
Dawlathā-ye Irān az Mošir-al-Dawla tā Mir Ḥosayn Musavi, bar asās-e daftar-e ṯabt-e kābinahā-ye naḵost-vaziri, Tehran, 2005.
Gāh-nāmeh: fehrest-e ruzberuz-e vaqāyeʿ-e siāsi, neżāmi, eqteṣādi, va ejtemāʿi-e Irān az 3 Esfand 1299 tā 30 Esfand 1355, Tehran, Ketāb-ḵāna-ye Pahlavi, 1976; repr., Paris, ca. 1985.
Majles-e šurā-ye melli, “Bayānāt-e Āqā-ye naḵost-vazir [Aḥmad Qavām] rājeʿ be gozāreš-e ʿamaliyāt-e dawlat nesbat be rawābeṭ bā Dawlat-e Etteḥād-e Jamāhir-e Šuravi-e Susiālisti,” Ruz-nāma-ye rasmi-e kešvar-e šāhanšāhi-e Irān, no. 783, 1947.
ʿAyn Vaḥid Māzandarāni, ed., Rāhnemā-ye ʿohud o ʿahd-nāmehā-ye tāriḵi-e Irān, Tehran, 1962.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, baḵš-e kār 1, rešte-ye kār 3, file 36.
Ministry of the Royal Court Archive, nos. 141-42, 159-62.
Moḏākarāt-e Majles-e šurā-ye melli, dawra-ye pānzdahom, 24 October 1947, pp. 2189-201.
United Nations archives:
Journal of the Security Council, year 1, nos. 1 (18 January 1946) to 42 (11 July 1946).
Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1946, Security Council Official Records: First Year, repr., New York, 1964.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1946, section on the Security Council, “1. The Iranian Question,” New York, 1947, pp. 227-36.
A.-A. ʿAlam, Yāddāšthā-ye ʿAlam, 7 vols., Bethesda, Md., 1992-2013.
M.-T. Malek-al-Šoʿarāʾ Bahār, Tāriḵ-e moḵtaṣar-e aḥzāb-e siāsi-e Irān, enqerāż-e Qājāriya, 2 vols., repr., Tehran, 1978-84.
Y. Dawlatābādi, Tāriḵ-e moʿāṣer yā ḥayāt-e Yaḥyā, 4 vols., Tehran, n.d., IV, pp. 385-87.
A. Ebtehāj, Ḵāṭerāt-e Abu’l-Ḥasan Ebtehāj, ed. ʿA.-R. ʿArużi, 2 vols., London, 1991.
N. Enteẓām, Ḵāṭerāt-e Naṣr-Allāh Enteẓām: Šahrivar-e 1320 az didgāh-e darbār, eds. M.-R. ʿAbbāsi and B. Ṭayarāni, Tehran, 1992.
Q. Ḡani, Yāddāšthā-ye Dr. Qāsem Ḡani, ed. S. Ḡani, 12 vols., London, 1980-84.
G. F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, Boston, 1967.
G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, A Study in Big Power Rivalry, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949, chap. 7.
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(Mansureh Ettehadieh and EIr.)
Last Updated: April 21, 2014