



'ABD-AL-RAZZĀQ LĀHĪJĪ

'**ABD-AL-RAZZĀQ** B. 'ALĪ B. AL-ḤOSAYN **LĀHĪJĪ**, 11th/17th-century theologian and philosopher (and poet under the pen name FAYYĀŽ). Little is known about his life; he came from Lāhījān but lived most of his later life in Qom. His teacher in philosophy was Mollā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1050/1641). In his works Lāhījī frequently refers to him in laudatory terms as our teacher (*ostādonā*), and his *divān* contains several eulogies of him. He does not mention any other teacher. In one poem he praises Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1630), stating that his thought had been an inspiration, but it seems unlikely that Lāhījī studied with him, at least for any prolonged period.

Lāhījī was intimately associated with Mollā Ṣadrā for many years. In a poem composed in Kāšān, he mentions having been Mollā Ṣadrā's student in this town before the latter departed for Isfahan and expresses his wish to join him there. He evidently did study with him in Isfahan for some time. It seems likely that he was also associated with Mollā Ṣadrā during the latter's seclusion near Qom (said to have lasted fifteen years). For, already prior to his teacher's death, he mentions in a poem having lived in Qom for over twenty years. On the other hand, there is no evidence that he was with Mollā Ṣadrā during the latter's stay in Shiraz, where he taught for some years before his death. Lāhījī married one of the daughters of his teacher. There seems to have been some rivalry between him and the other son-in-law student of Ṣadrā, Mollā Moḥsen Fayż, whose philosophical outlook greatly differed from his own. Both are said to have been given their pen names, Fayyāž and Fayż, by their father-in-law. In Qom Lāhījī taught at the Madrasa-ye Ma'šūma. Among his students were



Qāzī Sa‘īd Qomī and his own son Mīrzā Ḥasan (d. 1121/1709), author of several religious books. A second son, Ebrāhīm, is known to have written a work *al-Qawā‘ed al-ḥekmīya wa’l-kalāmīya*. Other data about Lāhījī’s life can be gleaned from his *dīvān*. He had friendly relations with the learned Sayyed Mīrzā Ḥabīballāh b. al-Ḥosayn al-Mūsavī al-Karakī, *ṣadr* under Shah Ṣafī I (1038-52/1629-42) and Shah ‘Abbās II (1052-77/1642-66) until his death ca. 1060/1650. Lāhījī congratulated him on his appointment as *ṣadr* and later addressed several panegyrics to him. He was also acquainted with Mīrzā Ṭāleb Khan Nāṣerī Ordūbādī (d. 1044/1634-35), whom he congratulated in a poem on his appointment as vizier by Shah Ṣafī. Several panegyrics in his *dīvān* are addressed to Shah Ṣafī. In one of them he mentions that he had dedicated books, treatises, and poems to him. He composed some eulogies for Shah ‘Abbās II, to whom he also dedicated his *Gawhar-e morād*. It seems, however, that he soon fell out of favor under the reign of the latter shah, while Mollā Moḥsen and Qāzī Sa‘īd Qomī gained public prominence. Some poems in which he reproaches a former student for his ingratitude after rising to high position may well be addressed to Qāzī Sa‘īd. The poet Ṣā‘eb Tabrīzī during his visit to Qom established ties of friendship with Lāhījī (see *Dīvān-e Ṣā‘eb*, ed. Amīrī Fīrūzkūhī, Tehran, 1345 Š./1966, p. 40). It is uncertain when Lāhījī died. The date given by K̄vānsārī, 1051/1641-42, is too early, since he was still alive after the accession of Shah ‘Abbās II. The date given by Šams-al-dīn Sāmī (*Qāmūs al-a‘lām*, Istanbul, 1314/1896, V, p. 3458), namely 1072/1661-62, may be accurate; but its source is unknown.

Works. The following of his books have been published: 1. *Gawhar-e morād* (Tehran, 1271/1885) in Persian, a detailed exposition of his theology, dedicated to Shah ‘Abbās II. It deals with all major subjects usually treated in Shi‘ite *kalām* works: ontology, theology, prophecy, imamate and the hereafter. 2. *Sarmāya-ye īmān* (publ. by Mīrzā Moḥammad Šīrāzī, Bombay, n.d.), also in Persian, a shorter and more elementary exposition, mostly of the same subjects as in *Gawhar-e morād*. It was written at the request of a friend who had seen the author’s copy of the latter work before its publication, and was intended for the use of beginning students. 3. *Šawāreq al-elhām*, in Arabic, a detailed commentary upon *Tajrīd al-‘aqā‘ed*, a *kalām* work by Naṣīr-al-dīn Ṭūsī widely used as the most advanced compendium on scholastic theology. Lāhījī quotes and discusses the previous commentaries on this work by Ebn Moṭahhar Ḥellī, Šams-al-dīn Eṣfahānī, and Qūšjī, as well as the glosses (*ḥavāšī*) on the latter commentary by Davānī and Ṣadr-al-dīn Daštakī, the *Šarḥ al-mawāqef* of Šarīf Jorjānī, and the *Šarḥ al-maqāṣed* of Taftāzānī. The work was



composed before *Gawhar-e morād* (where he refers to it) and was presumably used in his teaching. In final form it contains references to *Gawhar-e morād*. As published, the text breaks off abruptly in the discussion of the divine speech (*kalām*) after covering about two-thirds of the text of Ṭūsī in two large volumes. It is uncertain if the remainder of the commentary was left incomplete by the author or was later lost. Various lithographed editions have been published in Tehran (e.g., 1311/1893-94).

The following works are known to be extant in manuscript: 4. *Ḥawāšī ‘alā mabāḥeṭ jawāher al-šarḥ al-ḡadīd li’l-tarǧīd*, glosses on the chapters on substances in the commentary of Qūšǧī on Ṭūsī’s *Tarǧīd al-‘aqā’ed*. In the introduction Lāhīǧī states that he is abridging a larger commentary he had written previously. 5. *Ta’līqāt ‘alā al-ḡawāšī al-ḡafarīya ‘alā šarḥ elāhīyāt al-tarǧīd*, comments on the glosses of Šams-al-dīn Ḳafarī on Qūšǧī’s commentary on the theology section of the *Tarǧīd al-‘aqā’ed*. 6. *Ḥāšīa ‘alā šarḥ al-ešārāt*, a commentary on Ṭūsī’s commentary on the *Ketāb al-ešārāt* of Ebn Sīnā. Lāhīǧī takes a critical position toward the *Ketāb al-moḡākamāt* of Qoṭb-al-dīn Rāzī (d. 766/1365), who offered to arbitrate between the critical commentary of Faḡr-al-dīn Rāzī on *Ketāb al-ešārāt* and its refutation by Ṭūsī in his own commentary. 7. *Ḥāšīa ‘alā ḡašīyat ‘Abdallāh al-Yazdī ‘alā taḡdīb al-manṡeq*, a commentary on the commentary of ‘Abdallāh Yazdī on the *taḡdīb al-manṡeq* of Taftāzānī. 8. *Tašrīqāt*, containing three treatises in Persian on divine unity, justice and love. 9. *Dīvān* of his Persian poetry.

Also ascribed to him are the following works, of which no manuscripts have been found: 10. *Šarḥ al-ḡayākel fī ḡekmat al-ešrāq*, a commentary on Sohravardī’s *Ḥekmat al-ešrāq*. 11. *Resāla fī ḡodūt al-‘ālam*, on the origination of the world. 12. *Al-Kalemat al-ṡayyeba*, mentioned by himself, in which he arbitrated between the doctrines of Mīr Dāmād and Mollā Šadrā concerning the primacy of essence or existence and other matters. 13. *Mašāreq al-elḡām fī šarḥ tarǧīd al-ḡalām*. According to the author of *Rīāz al-‘olamā’* this commentary on Ṭūsī’s *Tarǧīd* is not identical with the *Šawāreq al-elḡām* and also remained incomplete. 14. A commentary (*šarḥ*) on the *Fošūš al-ḡekam* of Ebn al-‘Arabī (Rezā-qolī Hedāyat, *Taḡkera-ye Rīāz al-‘ārefīn*, ed. Mehr-‘Alī Gorgānī, Tehran, 1344 Š./1965, pp. 382f.).

Doctrine. Lāhīǧī stands at the end of a development in Islamic scholastic theology in which the thought system of *kalām* was gradually replaced by that of *falsafa*, especially that of the school of Ebn Sīnā. Although Lāhīǧī deals in his theological works with the subjects traditionally discussed in *kalām*, he



invariably supports the doctrine of the philosophers against that of the *kalām* theologians, except in the *sam‘iyāt* matters which are based on tradition rather than reason and thus are excluded from philosophical investigation. He maintains that *kalām* is essentially based on the Qur’ān and the Sunna, while *falsafa* or *ḥekma* is based on pure reason. *Kalām* therefore does not transcend the level of dialectics (*ǧadal*), while only *falsafa* can offer true proofs (*borhān*). Among the *kalām* theologians, the Mo‘tazela were closer to the truth than the Aš‘ariya, because the former sought to learn from the philosophers, while the latter stubbornly opposed them. The teaching of the Emāmīya, based upon the statements of the Imams, agrees mostly with the views of the philosophers. Its agreement with the doctrine of the Mo‘tazela is due to the fact that the latter borrowed from *falsafa*, not that the Emāmīya took their doctrine from the Mo‘tazela. Lāhījī’s adoption of philosophical doctrine thus goes far beyond that of Naṣīr-al-dīn Ṭūsī and includes theses considered particularly heretical by the *kalām* theologians, e.g., the existence of separate intelligences and celestial souls, the denial of the temporal creation of the world, the constitution of bodies out of matter and form, God’s being the necessitating cause (*‘ella mūǧeba*) of the world rather than its arbitrary creator, and His being the immediate source of only a single being, the Universal Intellect. He affirms that there can not be any conflict between religious truth and reason. Any thesis derived from religious texts which apparently contradicts a truth established by rational proof must be interpreted so as to remove the disagreement. If this is not possible, it indicates a defect in the rational argument. If the point at issue is one upon which the rational proof of the validity of the revealed religion (*šar‘*) rests, the argument must definitely be faulty, but in this case there never could be a consensus among the scholars concerning it. This is the case with the thesis of some philosophers denying God’s knowledge of particulars. If the point does not affect the proof of the validity of revealed religion, it may merely indicate that reason is intrinsically unable to resolve the question. This is the case in the question of the eternity of the world. Reason is unable to prove either the finitude or the infinitude of the temporal existence of the world. The temporal finitude of the world is known merely by the consensus of the prophets and men of religion. The finitude does not imply, however, the temporal priority of God, as the *kalām* theologians teach; for there was no time before the existence of the world. The world’s time, just like its space, is limited by absolute nothingness. God’s priority in respect to the world is not temporal but essential (*dāti*), that of the cause in respect to its effect, as the philosophers maintain.



On the question of predetermination versus human free will, Lāhījī, quoting a well-known statement of Imam Ja‘far, espouses a position between coercion (*ḡabr*) and empowerment (*tafvīz*). The doctrine of coercion he identifies with the Ash‘arite doctrine denying any choice (*ekṭīār*) to man in his acts. The thesis of empowerment is asserted by the Mo‘tazela, who hold that man is the sole cause of his acts, independently of the will of God. The intermediate position is upheld by the philosophers and the Emāmīya, who affirm that man has a free choice, which is, however, embedded in the chain of cause and effect originating in God. Everything that occurs in the world is thus determined by God’s will and providence (*‘enāya*), which unconditionally agrees with man’s best interest. Evil occurs by necessity, but merely accidentally (*be’l-‘arāz*), in the chain of causation and is not willed as such by God.

The philosophical positions espoused by Lāhījī are almost exclusively those of Ebn Sīnā. Despite his expressions of admiration for Ṭūsī, he consistently criticizes him for any departure from the doctrine of Ebn Sīnā. He generally also rejects the doctrine of his own revered teacher, Mollā Ṣadrā, wherever it appeared incompatible with the system of Ebn Sīnā. Yet he is clearly influenced by Mollā Ṣadrā’s interpretation of Ebn Sīnā and, in points where he is unable to accept Mollā Ṣadrā’s views, attempts to point out their positive aspects. As incompatible with Ebn Sīnā’s teaching, he repeatedly rejects Mollā Ṣadrā’s central thesis of substantial motion (*ḡaraka fi’l-ḡawhar*), as well as some doctrines he had adopted from Sohrawardī and Ebn al-‘Arabī, such as the identification of the separate intelligences with attributes of God and the reality of the realm of images (*‘ālam al-meṭāl*). His polite admission that, “on the assumption of the reality of the *‘ālam al-meṭāl*,” Mollā Ṣadrā’s views about it are the most sound should not be viewed as abrogating his positive assertion that the impossibility of its existence is conclusively demonstrable. In his discussion of the relationship of existence and essence in the *Ṣawāreq*, he agrees with Mollā Ṣadrā on the reality of existence, its having unique individuals (*afrād*) rather than mere portions (*ḡeṣaṣ*), and its applying ambiguously (*be’l-taṣkīk*) to the essences, against Sohrawardī’s view reducing existence to a mere abstraction. Like Mollā Ṣadrā he holds this view to be in accord with Ebn Sīnā’s teaching. He admits Mollā Ṣadrā’s further thesis that existence, rather than essence, is the object of production (*ḡa’l*) insofar as, in the latter’s system, no ambiguity could arise as to any subsistence (*ṭobūt*) of essences before their existence. In *Gawhar-e morād* (where his approach differs somewhat) he affirms that the object of production is essence. This agrees with the common formulation of the school of Ebn Sīnā. It should not



be seen as contradicting the previous admission; for, contrary to Mollā Ṣadrā, he did not basically deny the reality of essences. Concerning God’s knowledge of the world, he adopts Ebn Sīnā’s doctrine of its “active representative” (*ḥoṣūlī fe’lī*) nature against Sohrawardī’s thesis, accepted by most later philosophers, of its presential (*ḥozūrī*) character. Though his explanation of Ebn Sīnā’s view appears partially influenced by Mollā Ṣadrā’s, he refutes the latter’s objections to Ebn Sīnā’s thesis, terming them weak.

Lāhījī’s attitude toward Sufism is complex. While suggesting that there are many charlatans among the Sufis, he warns against repudiating all of them. He maintains that the Sufi way to truth, based on manifestation and immediate experience, is superior to that of the philosophers, based on rational demonstration. But he affirms that the former way can not lead to any knowledge contradicting the latter. It is evidently on this basis that he rejects all elements of the gnostic doctrine of Sohrawardī and Ebn al-‘Arabī which are claimed to be attainable only through illumination (*eṣrāq*) or mystical intuition. He supports the thesis of the Sufis on the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wojūd*) but rejects their explanation of it. Two other explanations, which attempt to formulate it in accord with philosophical doctrine, in his view are also open to objections. The first one regards being as a natural universal (*kollī ṭabī‘ī*), whose reality is shared by all individual beings prior to their individuation. The second one views the Necessary Being, God, as a particular (*ḥozūrī*) and as the only real being; all other things, having no independent being of their own, exist merely in relation to the Real Being. This view, which, according to Lāhījī, was ascribed to “the intuition of the theosophists” (*dawq al-mota’allehīn*) and was supported by Šarīf Jorjānī and Davānī, also agrees with some formulations of Mollā Ṣadrā. Lāhījī himself supports what he terms the method of the philosophers. It rests, on the one hand, on the thesis that all contingent beings have their source of perfection in the Necessary Being and, on the other, on the thesis that all things in the world occur in accordance with the absolute goodness eternally known, conceived (*moṣavvara*), and willed by God. Their external existence is thus related to the Necessary Being in the same way as mental existence is to the human mind.

It has been suggested that Lāhījī actually inclined to Sufi and illuminationist thought like his teacher Mollā Ṣadrā but concealed his true beliefs out of fear of being accused of heresy. The internal evidence adduced in support of this assumption is not convincing. In spite of some minor inconsistencies, Lāhījī’s thought appears, throughout his works, dominated by his conviction of the



continued validity of the integral teaching of Ebn Sīnā as against later critics and interpreters. There was, moreover, hardly occasion for him to fear such an accusation; Mollā Moḥsen and Qāzī Sa‘īd Qomī, who supported Sufi doctrine much more consistently than Mollā Ṣadrā, in fact gained greater worldly success and prominence under Shah ‘Abbās II than Lāhījī.

As a philosopher, Lāhījī is more receptive than original. Only rarely does he offer a novel solution to any question. Yet his grasp of philosophical concepts and problems is solid, and his treatment of them combines thoroughness with clarity. It is evidently for these qualities that some of his works have remained popular textbooks until modern times.

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