KOKAND KHANATE (Pers. Ḵōqand; Turkic Qüqon), a state based in the Farḡāna (q.v.) valley in Central Asia (1709-1876), whose territory encompassed modern Uzbekistan, south Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

The Khanate of Kokand emerged over the course of the 18th century, and in the 19th century it played an important role in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Chinese Turkistan, and the Pamirs. In the late 1830s, at the apogee of its territorial expansion, it covered an area of some 250,000 square miles (Levi, p. 218). Its most northerly point was marked by a fortress at Ulu Tau mountains (in modern Jezkazgan province, central Kazakhstan, 48º N); in the south, it extended as far as Sariqol (modern Tāšqurḡān [Taxkorgan], in Xinjiang, 39º N), in the west to Āq Masjed (modern Kyzylorda, in south Kazakhstan, 65º E), and in the east to the fortress of Karakol, (in the Issyk Kul basin, Kyrghyzstan, 78º E; Beisembiev, 2000, p. 288; Newby; Ploskikh, p. 106; Sokolov, pp. 44-47). Its population in the 1830s exceeded 5 million people, comprised of 3 million sedentary people of Turkic and Iranian origin (Sartiya, Tājikiya, Andiya) and about 400,000 tribal (nomadic) households, i.e., a population of approximately 2-2.5 million of Turko-Mongolian extraction: Uzbeks, Kazaks, Farḡāni Qepčak, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Qalmāqs, etc. (Namangāni, fol. 47b; Bacqué-Grammont, pp. 194-95, 207-10).

Initial stage (18th century). The state began to emerge in the first half of the 18th century, a period that witnessed the weakening of links between Farḡāna and the central power at Bukhara (see BUKHARA iii. and iv.), the incursions of Kirghiz, Kazak, and Mongolian Oyrat (also Qalmāq) nomads, and the growing influence of local Sufi orders and their leaders, the Khojas (Ḵᵛājagān). In 1709, having destroyed his rivals amongst the Khojas of Čādak (in north Farḡāna), Šāhroḵ Biy (r. 1709-22), a chief of the Uzbek tribe of Ming (“One Thousand”), founded a fortress (Iski Qurḡān) near modern Kokand (south Farḡāna) and was proclaimed its ruler (Beisembiev, 1987, p. 11; Levi, pp. 14-18). During the tumultuous nomadic invasions of the Samarkand and Bukhara oases in the 1720s and 1730s, Farḡāna suffered relatively little damage, and many refugees from the devastated neighboring lands migrated to Kokand. In the midst of these upheavals, ʿAbd-al-Raḥim Biy (r. 1722-34), the elder son and successor of Šāhroḵ Biy, managed temporarily to capture Ḵojand (see KHUJAND), Ŭro-teppa (Ura-Tyube) and what then remained of Samarkand, and also concluded a dynastic alliance with the Keneges, the ruling Uzbek tribe in Šahr-e Sabz (Keš; Beisembiev, 1987, pp. 11-12; Levi, p. 24). In 1740, his brother, ʿAbd-al-Karim Biy (r. 1734-51), transferred his residence to a new place near the ruins of another old fortress (Iski Urda) where he erected a fortified palace that became the site of the modern city of Qüqon (Beisembiev, 1987, p. 12). Although Kokand escaped Nāder Shah’s (q.v.) invasion of Transoxiana in 1740, it was several times beleaguered in the 1740s by the confederation of western Mongol tribes known as the Jungars (Zhungar, Zunḡaar), the population of which is referred to in some historical literature as both Oyrats and Qalmāqs (Moiseev, pp. 161, 173; Levi, p. 34). ʿAbd-al-Karim Biy’s successor, Erdāna Biy b. ʿAbd-al-Raḥim Biy (r. 1751-52, 1753-69) , was removed from power for a year (ca. 1752-53) when the Jungars enthroned their own protégé, Bābā Biy, another son of ʿAbd-al-Raḥim Biy who had been forced to live among the Jungars in exchange for their withdrawal from the valley. Erdāna Biy was succeeded by Solaymān Biy b. Šādi Biy b. Šāhroḵ Biy (who reigned for only 3 or 6 months in 1769-70) and then by Nārbuta Biy b. ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Biy b. ʿAbd-al-Karim Biy (r. 1770-99).

The period was marked by economic growth and the gradual unification of the Farḡāna (q.v.) valley under the power of Kokand. It also saw a considerable influx of both sedentary and nomadic peoples into the valley from neighboring regions. Migration into the valley was so significant in this period that three out of the four leading communities of the city of Kokand were of foreign origin: Samarqandi, Kāšḡari, and Kuhestāni. Many Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, and Kazaks (mainly from the tribe of Qepčak) who were under pressure from the Jungars took asylum in the valley, and 9,000 families are said to have migrated to Farḡāna from Eastern Turkistan following the Qing conquest (1756-59; Badaḵši, p. 46 and fol. 34b). In addition, highland Tajiks and other peoples from the Pamirs, Badaḵšān (q.v.), and Chitral (q.v.; Čatrār) made their way into the valley throughout the 18th century and beyond (Ivanov, 1958, pp. 179-81). This influx of peoples contributed to the ability of the Šāhroḵid dynasty to consolidate their power, as they depended heavily upon the sedentary population. Kokand’s expanding commercial relationship with the Qing markets, addressed below, represents another factor driving its growth and centralization from the reign of Erdāna Biy onward. By the time of Nārbuta Biy, many of the social and economic effects of these changes were becoming apparent. For example, Nārbuta Biy started to mint a copper coin (qarā pul), just one of which was supposedly worth the value of one sheep (Beisembiev, 1987, p. 67; Ishankhanov, pp. 5, 18; Levi, p. 70).

In their efforts to unify Farḡāna, the rulers of Kokand confronted the determined resistance of nomadic tribes and clans as well as the theocratic ambitions of the Khojas. In about 1748, the Qepčaks had proclaimed Šiḡāy (d. 1750) b. Barak Sultan b. Tursun Khan Kazak their khan in the Yāzi (< Turkic yāz “summer; festival”) plain, in central Farḡāna (Beisembiev, 2000, pp. 278-79). They then attacked Kokand, but were defeated and lost Töra Qurḡān, the residence of the governor of Namangān. The struggle over Ḵojand that took place between Kokand and the Yüz (“One Hundred”), a powerful Uzbek tribe which before the early 19th century had controlled the area of Jizaḵ, Ŭro-teppa, Ḵojand, Ḥeṣār-e Šādmān (see Ḥeṣār) and for a time Qurama (the Angren valley), focused on the “Ḵojand Gate,” the strategically important entrance to the Farḡāna valley. In 1754, joined by the Mangit (Manḡyt) ruler of Bukhara (q.v.), Moḥammad Raḥim (d. 1758), Erdāna Biy took the field against Ŭro-teppa (Mukhtarov, pp. 18-20; Levi, p. 40).

Notable Sufi leaders, such as the Khojas of north Farḡāna (Čādak, Čost, and Kāsān), tried to exert their spiritual and political control over Farḡāna’s population and frequently sought support from their allies amongst the Khojas of Tashkent, their Kazak adherents, and other nomadic groups. During this period the rulers of Kokand, for their part, used Sufi connections to legitimize their right to political power, claiming that their ancestor, Čamaš Ṣufi, had been a disciple (morid) of Loṭf-Allāh Čosti (a famous 16th-century Central Asian Naqšbandi authority) who allegedly had delivered to Čamaš the prophecy that his descendants would be rulers (Beisembiev, 1983b, pp. 99-100).

In the 1760s, Farḡāna was still divided into four dependencies: Andejān (q.v.; Andijān), Namangān, Marḡilān, and Kokand, but the last named was dominant (Bichurin, p. 575). With the Manchu conquest of Xinjiang, trade and diplomatic relations had been established between Kokand and China (Toru). Struggling for leadership in Farḡāna, the Kokand biys courted the Manchu Emperor (Ḵāqān-e Čin) as an ally, a stance which the Qing chose to interpret as a request for protection and recognition of Qing suzerainty. In reality, for the next century Kokand’s official relationship with Beijing remained deliberately vague and open for negotiation depending upon the circumstances of the time.

In the late 1790s, at the end of Nārbuta Biy’s rule, a mutiny took place under the leadership of his half-brother Ḥāji Biy b. ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Biy. The fact that the uprising was summarily put down indicates the extent to which Kokand had by this time strengthened its hold over Farḡāna. From the 18th to early 19th century, the ruling class of this new state consisted of the aristocracy from the tribes of the Ming, Qepčak, and Kirghiz, as well as the Khojas of Čādak and Kāsān, Maḵdum-e Aʿẓami, Aḥrāri, Loṭf-Allāh-e Čosti and others. The Ming had two collateral branches: the descendants of ʿAšurqul Atālyq (reigning) and Fāżel Atālyq (non-reigning but powerful; Beisembiev, 1985).

The period of expansion (1799-1842). The rise of Kokand to the status of a regional power was inseparably linked to the policies implemented during the reign of ʿĀlem Khan (r. 1799-1811), Nārbuta Biy’s eldest son and successor. In domestic affairs, ʿĀlem Khan endeavored to reorganize the ruling class by redistributing power in favor of new groups within the service class. Kokandi forces expanded into the Pamirs, and ʿĀlem Khan recruited from his new subjects an army of Tajik conscripts, up to 6,000 men strong, known as the Ḡalča (Levi, p. 82). This relatively regular army was rigorously trained and equipped with current weapons technologies. After suppressing theocratic movements in Čost and taking Ḵojand (1220/1805-6), ʿĀlem Khan succeeded in uniting all of Farḡāna and, in 1806, he led his Ḡalča troops to victory against Ŭro-teppa. Having routed the invading army of Yunos Khoja, the ruler of Tashkent (1220/1805-6), at Ḡurumsarāy in Farḡāna, ʿĀlem Khan launched a campaign against Tashkent. His troops subdued Qurama, conquered Tashkent, and abolished the Khoja’s theocracy (1224/1809-10).

By this time, ʿĀlem Khan had assumed the title of khan, and evidence suggests that the rulers of Kokand had also begun to claim their origin from Āltun Bēšik (< Turkic, lit. “Golden Cradle”), the legendary son of Bābor (q.v.), the final Timurid ruler of Farḡāna and founder of the Mughal Empire in India (Levi, pp. 98-107). According to this legend, prior to departing Farḡāna for India at the end of the fifteenth century, Bābor placed his infant son in a golden cradle and left him behind so that his lineage could someday provide leadership for the people of the valley. The legend exists in multiple versions, all of which trace the ancestry of Šāhroḵ Biy, the Uzbek Ming tribal chief who defeated the Khojas of Čādak and whose ancestors ruled as the khans of Kokand, to Āltun Bēšik.

The earliest documentary evidence for the Āltun Bēšik legend dates to nearly a decade after ʿĀlem Khan’s death (Erkinov, 2013, p. 4), but the ideological development that underpins it began during ʿĀlem Khan’s reign, if not before. This trend reflected the revival of the idea of the Chaghatay (Čaḡatāy) state in Transoxiana (similar events occurred contemporaneously in Bukhara and Šahr-e Sabz [Keš]) where Chingizid (see ČENGIZ KHAN) traditions that had dominated political life from the 13th to the early 16th century stipulated the legitimate right of the Chaghatay khans (see CHAGHATAYID DYNASTY) and, more importantly, their “legal” successors, the Timurids, to rule in the territory of the Chaghatay dominion (ulus). Under the Chingizid Abu’l Khayrids (also Shaibanid Uzbeks) and Ashtarkhanids (also Toqay-Timurids) in the 16-18th centuries (see CENTRAL ASIA vi), this idea had lost currency in Central Asia, but it had meanwhile found its supporters in Mughal India. In the early 18th century, as the Chingizid Ashtarkhanids grew weak and ineffective, peoples across the region looked to the Timurids as a more successful model of governance (Sela). The Āltun Bēšik legend elevated the idea that the rulers of Kokand had a Timurid ancestry to the level of dogma, providing the descendants of Šāhroḵ Biy with an important source of political legitimacy (Beisembiev, 1983b; idem, 2000).

The new centralizing policies that ʿĀlem Khan imposed provoked resentment among the aristocracy that Nārbuta Biy had depended upon and that had flourished during his long reign, and they began to refer to their ruler as ʿĀlem ẓālem, or ʿĀlem the Tyrant. In the winter of 1225/1810-11, ʿĀlem Khan organized a campaign in south Kazakhstan (Dašt-e Qepčak), but his Tajik expeditionary forces suffered severely from the freezing weather conditions and many became disaffected. Leaving ʿĀlem Khan in Tashkent, a group of Uzbek nobles fled to the capital and proclaimed his younger brother ʿOmar as the new khan. While returning to Kokand, ʿĀlem Khan was abandoned by his army and murdered (Moḥammad Ḥakim Khan, pp. 437-46; Ivanov, 1939; Levi, pp. 90-92).

The reigns of ʿOmar Khan (1811-22) and his son Moḥammad ʿAli Khan (“Madali”; 1822-42) witnessed the further decline of the established aristocracy’s supremacy at court as various palace cliques came to dominance. Nonetheless, the legacy of ʿĀlem Khan’s military reforms and other centralization efforts enabled the khanate to continue to expand during this period. Most notable is Kokand’s expansion in Kazakhstan. In 1816, Kokandi forces captured the city of Turkistan, famous for its mausoleum of the saint Khoja (Ḵ^vāja) Aḥmad Yasavi, which Timur had erected in the fourteenth century. After suppressing several uprisings by Kazak Chingizids, by the late 1820s Kokand had established its control over all of southern Kazakhstan. This included all of the territory of modern Kirghizstan and even parts of the Semirechye (< Turkic Jetysu “area of seven rivers”) region in southeast Kazakhstan. Kokandi territory extended as far eastward as the border with the Qing Empire in Xinjiang.

Kokand secured these territorial acquisitions through the construction of a 1,000-kilometer-long chain of fortifications running from the lower stretches of the Syr Darya river in the west to the left bank of the Ili River in the east. Kokand’s policy towards the newly conquered territories was at times harsh, but its conquest of southern Kazakhstan and northern Kirghizstan was the first serious attempt to restore sedentary civilization in those areas since the Mongol invasion. Several of the fortresses that Kokand established in this period subsequently developed into middle or large-sized cities, including Alma Ata (Almaty), Āq Masjed (modern Kyzylorda), Awliā Atā (modern Taraz), Čimkent (modern Shymkent), Karakol, Merke, and Pišpek (modern Bishkek, founded ca. 1825; Beisembiev, 2000, pp. 285-94).

In the 1820s, Kokand’s relations with the Qing entered a new phase. The essence of Kokand’s policy towards Beijing may be summarized as follows: whilst eschewing open or long confrontation with the Manchu administration in Xinjiang, Kokand utilized the precarious nature of Qing rule in that region to its own advantage in order to extract the maximum economic advantages available via its “Andejāni” merchant communities and official representatives (aqsaqāl) who levied duties from all immigrants of Transoxiana in Qing Xinjiang (Newby; Beisembiev, 1983a, pp. 249-50).

In 1826, Kokandi forces invaded the area of Kashgar (q.v.) in support of Jahāngir Khoja’s rebellion (Newby). Jahāngir Khoja’s campaign provoked a widespread popular uprising and for some months he enjoyed a temporary victory. But Chinese troops soon returned the region to Qing hands and Beijing enforced a punitive punishment on Kokand for its role in the very expensive rebellion, which cost the Qing some 11 million tael of silver to put down (Millward, p. 63). In 1830, Kokandis organized a new campaign and besieged the Manchu citadel (golbāḡ) of Kashgar. This campaign failed, but suppressing it also represented a significant drain on the Qing treasury. The result was a complete reversal in Qing foreign policy. This is illustrated in the 1832 agreement between the two powers, according to which Kokand obtained from Beijing both restitution for confiscated resources and new economic concessions in Xinjiang. (These privileges were in effect until Yaʿqub Bek led another uprising in Xinjiang in 1864; Newby.) The 1830s saw Ḵokand extend its activity in a southerly direction, in close connection with its trade interests in Xinjiang. In about 1834, using as a pretext the arrival of the pretender Atālïq Khan b. ʿĀlem Khan in Qarātegin, Madali Khan sent an army to this mountain area and conquered it. Kokandi forces continued on (1834-40) and occupied additional strategic points on the trade route between Xinjiang and Pamir-Badaḵšān.

Kokand’s dramatic territorial expansion and ambitions in the west gave rise to a long-standing rivalry with Bukhara, with Ŭro-teppa as the focal point of contention (Mukhtarov, pp. 21-41). In 1813, ʿOmar Khan led his forces to the upper Zarafšān valley in support of the small states of Šahr-e Sabz and Urgut in their struggle against the Bukharan Amir Ḥaydar (r. 1800-26; Mollā ʿAvaż, fol. 80b). In 1821, coordinating his actions with the khan of Khiva and the Ḵitāy-Qepčaks of Miānkal (who had revolted against Amir Ḥaydar) ʿOmar Khan organized a new campaign and blockaded Samarqand (idem, fol. 108a). In the 1830s, Kokand finally seized Ŭro-teppa. From this period onward, the rivalry between Kokand and Bukhara became a defining characteristic of the political life in the region.

This period was marked by a significant expansion in the economic and cultural life of the khanate. Since the early decades of the 18th century, wave upon wave of migrant populations fleeing turbulent political environments or other forces made their way to Farḡāna from Samarqand, the Pamirs, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Facing a rising population and insufficient arable land, the Kokandi administration executed a series of large-scale irrigation projects designed to turn migrants and refugees into tax-paying subjects (Levi). The earliest of these efforts was implemented already in the 18th century, during the reign of Nārbuta Biy. In the 1810s, ʿOmar Khan ordered one canal dug near Namangān and another in southeast Farḡāna, where in 1231/1815-16 he founded a new town, Šahreḵān (lit. “Khan’s City”; Mollā ʿAvaż, fol. 133b). In the 1830s, Kokand endeavored to reclaim desert lands in the Steppe of Dalvarzin, later known as the Golodnaia (“hungry”) steppe between Ḵojand and Ŭro-teppa (Moḥammad Ṣāleḥ, folios 434a-435a). Hydraulic engineering remained a key feature of Kokand’s domestic policies even to its final days, beginning the gradual transformation of the Farḡāna valley into the considerably more populous and agriculturally rich region that it is today.

In the cultural sphere, ʿOmar Khan was himself a gifted poet, he was patron to some seventy men of letters, and he developed a court culture in Kokand designed to mimic the celebrated Timurid court of fifteenth-century Herat (q.v.; Levi, pp. 107-19; Erkinov 2008). It was also during his reign that the first official chronicles of Kokand were composed. The art of book illustration in Farḡāna, which was heavily influenced by the Kashmir style, also flourished (Ismailova, pp. 91-98, 107), and paper produced in Kokand became famous throughout Central Asia for its impressive quality. The state’s main language was Persian with Chaghatay Turkic (see Chaghatay Language and Literature) occupying a secondary place. (See also, DELŠĀD BARNA and NĀDERA)

Socio-political crisis and Russian conquest (1841-76). By 1840, with Kokandi forces in charge of the Pamirs and the full stretch of the southern steppe, and with Moḥammad-ʿAli Khan showing signs that he next intended to direct his expansionist aspirations westward, the prospect of a war with Bukhara (1841-43) was perhaps inevitable. By this time, the Bukharan Amir Naṣr-Allāh b. Amir Ḥaydar (r. 1827-60) had invested resources into the establishment a regular army (foot and artillery) commanded by ʿAbd-al-Ṣamad Irāni that was well trained and equipped with technologically current weaponry (Holzwarth). Taking advantage of the abysmally low public opinion of Moḥammad-ʿAli Khan (Levi), in 1841, Bukharan forces defeated the Kokandis at Ŭro-teppa and took Ḵojand. The following year, Amir Naṣr-Allāh invaded and conquered Farḡāna (May 1842). Moḥammad-ʿAli Khan and his relatives were executed.

During the brief ten-week period that Kokand was under Bukharan rule, the amir endeavored to consolidate his control through the implementation of a pro-Khoja policy. He appointed Bukharan clergy to key posts, but the Kokandis would not have it. Bukharan rule was quickly brought to an end in an uprising supported by Farḡāna’s nomads. With Moḥammad-ʿAli Khan dead, the Uzbek Ming leadership and other Kokandi nobles brought Šir ʿAli Bek b. Ḥāji Biy from the Talās valley and proclaimed him khan. Already by August 1842, Farḡāna had been completely liberated from the Bukharans (Levi, p. 155). Soon thereafter, Amir Naṣr-Allāh led an unsuccessful counter-offensive that culminated in a fruitless siege of Kokand. Meanwhile, in the west, Bukhara came under attack from Khiva. The Bukharan invasion ended with the amir’s retreat from Farḡāna in autumn 1842 and Kokand’s recovery of Tashkent the following year (Nalivkin, pp. 138-52; Beisembiev, 1985; Levi, pp. 160-62).

The restoration of the khanate had been made possible primarily due to the involvement of Farḡāna’s nomads, who subsequently launched their own bid for power. In this period, the struggle between nomads and the sedentary (Sart) aristocracy became a defining feature of domestic politics. In 1844, the Qepčaks carried out a successful coup d’état. Their enemies, who had killed Šir ʿAli Khan and briefly placed Morād Khan b. ʿĀlem Khan in power, failed to oppose them. Thus Mosolmānqol, a Qepčak leader, was able to proclaim Šir ʿAli Khan’s youngest son, Ḵodāyār Khan, as ruler and to govern on his behalf (r. 1844-58, first reign). Meanwhile, the Sarts gradually consolidated power, making Tashkent a center of anti-Qepčak resistance (Nabiev, 1966). In October 1852, Ḵodāyār Khan and his Sart supporters carried out another coup d’état and routed the Qepčaks in the battle of Bilqillama (Nalivkin, pp. 155-80; Nabiev, 1973, pp. 32-48; Beisembiev, 1987, pp. 118-20).

In subsequent years, Russia began its southward march of conquest. In 1853, General Perovskiĭ captured Kokand’s westernmost stronghold of Āq Masjed. In 1854, the Russians captured the Kokandian fortress of Alma Ata, and founded on its site Fort Vernoe/Vernyi (modern Alma Ata), thereby securing control of Zailiĭskiĭ Kraĭ (the “Trans-Ili Region” south of the Ili river). The Crimean War (1853-56), the Caucasian War (till 1864), the Reforms (late 1850s-70s), and the Polish uprising (1863-64) only delayed Russia’s southward advances.

Supported by Kirghiz tribes, in 1858 Malla Khan overthrew his younger half-brother, Ḵodāyār Khan, and ascended the throne. In 1862, Malla Khan was killed by his former nomadic supporters who now preferred to rule themselves with a puppet ruler, Shah Morād Khan b. Sarymsāq Khan (ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Bek) b. Šir ʿAli Khan (February-June 1862). In foreign affairs, this period was marked by Kokand’s second occupation of Qarātegin in 1859 (due to the efforts of the dethroned Ḵodāyār Khan; Mollā ʿAvaż, fol. 254a-b) and an abortive attempt to recapture Zailiĭskiĭ Kraĭ in 1860. The ensuing war between Ḵodāyār Khan (r. 1862-63, second reign) and the nomadic coalition resulted in victory for the latter (Mollā Moḥammad Yunos, pp. 48-60). From 1863-65, under the nominal Sultan Sayyed Khan b. Malla Khan b. Šir ʿAli Khan, executive authority was in the hands of the young, energetic military commander ʿAlemqol (ʿAliqoli), Amir-e laškar-e Kirghiz-Qepčak. ʿAlemqol desperately tried to halt further Russian advances, but in 1864, the Russians took the cities of Turkistan, Merke, Aulie Ata, and Čimkent, and began to move against Tashkent. In May 1865, Major General Cherniaev and his forces besieged Tashkent. ʿAlemqul fell in its defense, and Cherniaev captured the city. The Bukharan amir Moẓaffar b. Amir Naṣr-Allāh (r. 1860-85) then invaded Farḡāna, drove out Ḵodāyqoli Khan b. Maqṣud Bek b. Bēk Buta Bek b. Solaymān Biy (r. May-July 1865) and once again enthroned Ḵodāyār Khan (r. 1865-75, third reign) as ruler of Kokand. Now a vassal of the amir, Ḵodāyār Khan, was forced to concede Ḵojand to Bukhara. In 1866-68, the Bukharan amir was crushed by the Russians and lost control of Ḵojand, Ŭro-teppa, Jizaḵ, and Samarqand. The Kokand-Russian trade treaty of 1868 reduced the khanate to a de facto Russian protectorate (Khalfin, pp. 232-33).

During this period, Ḵodāyār Khan implemented a number of policies designed to stabilize Kokand’s political culture, including seeking a rapprochement with his nomadic subjects, executing another large-scale irrigation project, the Uluḡ Nahr canal (Levi, pp. 203-4) and working to develop a profitable commercial relationship with his new Russian neighbors. But chronic instability undermined his efforts. Earlier in the 19th century (1810-40), Tashkent had been administered by two eminent figures, Rajab Qošbēgi Badaḵšāni and Laškar Bēklārbēgi, a former khan’s slave from Chitral (Beisembiev, 2000, pp. 286-88). But in the period of 1841-65, the city and the whole of southern Kazakhstan was administered by 21 successive governors, 7 of whom occupied this position twice (Beisembiev, 2004).

During his last period in power, Ḵodāyār Khan tried to adapt his state to the new colonial realities in the region, which caused further unease among Farḡāna’s population. Multiple rebellious groups emerged with little in common other than dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs, animosity toward Ḵodāyār Khan, and a deep-seated fear of Russia. New taxes and other fiscal measures designed to restore Kokand’s infrastructure and defenses sparked widespread distrust and discontent, while the brutal execution of several Kirghiz notables sparked the Kirghiz uprising of 1874-76 (Bobobekov, pp. 64-100). Ḵodāyār Khan’s officers, who were sent to suppress the Kirghiz, went over to the rebels, and the khan himself fled to Tashkent under Russian protection.

The insurgents enthroned Ḵodāyār Khan’s eldest son, Naṣr-al-Din Khan (r. 1875-76), who opened ill-prepared hostilities against Russia. In response, the Russian troops subjugated Kokand and dictated a new treaty according to which Naṣr-al-Din Khan agreed to pay a hefty indemnity to Russia, recognized himself as Russia’s vassal de jure, and transferred all the lands in northern Farḡāna (on the right bank of the Syr Darya) to the Russian administration in Tashkent. This instigated a new uprising, led by Mollā Eṣḥāq Kirghiz, who as a pretender laid claim to the throne under the false name of Pulād Khan, the grandson of ʿĀlem Khan (Pulād Khan b. Morād Khan b. ʿĀlem Khan). Thus, the image and cult of ʿĀlem Khan was resurrected as an ideological reaction to the Russian colonial conquest.

The Russian Governor General Konstantin von Kaufman (1818-82) entrusted the task of pacifying Farḡāna to the ambitious Colonel Skobelev, a future hero of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. During the winter campaign of 1875-76, Skobelev liquidated all the centers of Kokandian resistance. Pulād Khan was captured and executed, as were many other resistance leaders. On 2 February (19 February, Old Style) 1876, an edict from the Tsar enunciated the annexation of the khanate and gave it the new title of Farḡāna Province under the Turkistan Governorate General of the Russian Empire (Levi, p. 208).

The final stage of the khanate’s existence was also not without significant advances. For example, this period saw the continuing development of irrigation works in Farḡāna under Mosolmānqol (early 1850s) and Ḵodāyār Khan (1869-71), and in terms of cultural life, there was a genuine flourishing of literature, most notably the writing of numerous important works of Kokand Khanate historiography in Persian and Turkic.